Abstract
with their internal memory representations. Thus, recognition tests involve perceptual as well 6 as memory processes. The perception of the stimulus in recognition memory tests can affect 7 whether the stimulus is recognized as old or new. One excellent example of this is "memory 8 illusion," reported by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) . They demonstrated that a stimulus 9 preceded by a masked unconscious prime was more likely to be recognized as old, thus, 10 suggesting that increased processing fluency generates increased feelings of familiarity for 11 the stimulus, leading to increased "old" responses.
13
Furthermore, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) reported that participants were more 14 likely to recognize a stimulus as new when it was preceded by a visible prime. They 15 explained this reversion of the priming effect using the idea that participants attribute some 16 parts of perceived fluency to a visible prime and discount fluency for the stimulus. This One potent method to manipulate fluency is attentional cueing (e.g., Posner, 1980 ; It is important to take note of the results of a study by Rajaram and Geraci (2000) . In 5 this study, participants performed a Remember/Know recognition memory test (Tulving, 6 1985; Gardiner, 1988) while stimulus fluency was manipulated by conceptual priming. The 7 results demonstrated that priming selectively affected "know" responses but did not affect 8 "remember" responses. These results provided strong support for the dual-process theory of 9 recognition memory, which assumes that recollection and familiarity depend on different The selective effect of fluency manipulation on know responses is compatible with 14 two influential models of recognition memory. Under the dual-process signal detection 15 (DPSD) model (Yonelinas, 1994) , recollection is considered an all-or-none threshold process, 16 which cannot be affected by fluency manipulation. However, familiarity is considered a assuming that fluency manipulation affects familiarity distribution but leaves recollection 25 distribution relatively unaffected. We return to this point in the General Discussion.
27
In the present study, we investigated the effect of attentional cueing on recollection 28 and familiarity using the Remember/Know procedure. If the stimulus-irrelevant attentional 29 cue biases memory, this will be a matter of significant importance in the theoretical 30 understanding of human memory and in our lives outside the laboratory. 
Preliminary Experiment

33
We conducted a preliminary study to explore appropriate sample size and other task 34 settings (e.g., set size of stimuli, and duration of attentional cue). We expected that attentional 35 cueing would affect participants' recognition bias but not recognition accuracy. Dissimilar to 36 the main experiment, participants were explicitly instructed to attend to the direction of the 37 cue. of memory according to the Remember/Know procedure (Gardiner, 1988) . "Remember" 37 responses indicated that recognition was accompanied by a conscious recollection of the 38 5 specific details of the stimulus or through contextual information from the study session.
1
"Know" responses indicated that the recognition was supported by a vague feeling of 2 familiarity without conscious recollection of stimulus details or contextual information.
3
Before the experiment, participants were instructed that half of the stimuli in the test session 4 were new and that the other half were old. This instruction was given to prevent participants 5 from being too conservative in judging whether the stimuli were old or new.
7
During each test trial, after the presentation of the fixation cross for 1500 ms, an 8 arrow was presented for 500 ms as an attentional cue, followed by the stimulus (Figure 1 ). In 9 the preliminary study, participants were explicitly instructed to attend to the direction of the 10 attentional cue. The stimulus continued to be presented until participants responded. The After the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire in which they were asked 20 whether they assumed any relationships to exist between the attentional condition
21
(congruent/incongruent) and the study status of the stimulus (old/new). 
Results and Discussion
11
The post-experiment questionnaire showed that no participants assumed the existence 12 of any relationships between the attentional condition and the study status of the stimulus.
13
Recognition memory performances and reaction times for old/new judgments in each 14 condition are summarized in observed. An interaction was nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 0.25, p = .620, partial η 2 = .013).
29
The results indicate that the correct recognition of old stimuli was more frequent in the 30 incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. The RT in old/new judgments for old 31 stimuli was significantly faster in the congruent condition than in the incongruent condition (t 32 (19) = 5.02, p < .001, d′ = 1.12).
34
We also analyzed recognition accuracy (Pr 
Results
3
The post-experiment questionnaire showed that no participants assumed the 4 existence of any relationships between the attentional condition and the study status of the 5 stimulus. Recognition memory performances and reaction times for old/new judgments in 6 each condition are summarized in Table 2 . Recollection and familiarity were estimated under 7 the IRK assumption. Third, we analyzed recognition accuracy (Pr) under the IRK assumption (Table 2) .
37
We conducted an ANOVA on Pr with metamemory and attentional condition as Finally, we analyzed recognition bias (Br) under the IRK assumption (Table 2) . We 
General Discussion
29
The main experiment provides the novel finding that stimulus-irrelevant attentional 30 cues bias recognition memory judgments and induce familiarity-based false recognition.
31
Although we did not explicitly instruct participants to attend to the direction of the arrow cue, congruent condition; however, the opposite occurred in this study.
14
The present findings may also be explained in the context of the 15 discrepancy-attribution theory (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998 , 2001 ). This theory 16 assumes that a feeling of familiarity arises when actual fluency is discrepant from expected judgments.
29
Attentional cueing only affected the estimate of familiarity; the estimate of 30 recollection was not affected. As we mentioned in the introduction, the pattern of the results
31
is compatible with two influential models of dual-process recognition memory. In the DPSD 32 model (Yonelinas, 1994) , recollection is thought to depend on an all-or-none threshold 33 process, whereas familiarity is a continuous variable that can be influenced by fluency may not be process-pure measures of recollection and familiarity; these putative measures of 7 recollection could partially reflect familiarity and thus be affected by fluency manipulation. this kind of memory bias is of serious concern in some cases, such as eyewitness testimony.
28
To explore the generality and applicability of the effect reported here, additional studies using comparison), suggesting that they depended more heavily on intentional memory processing.
5
Future research is needed to explore the factors that modulate the effect of attentional cueing 6 on recognition judgments. Another issue is that there were no control conditions and thus we 7 could only conduct relative comparisons between the congruent and incongruent conditions.
8
Establishing an appropriate control condition enables us to separately assess the effect of 
Conclusion
16
Attentional cueing biases familiarity-based recognition judgments. This effect is well 17 explained by the hypothesis regarding unintentional processing about the source of fluency.
18
As attentional cueing is a simple yet powerful method for manipulating fluency, it would be SD is shown in parenthesis. SD is shown in parenthesis. i Additional analyses for the preliminary experiment Additional analyses were conducted using the raw proportion of remember and know responses without the IRK procedure (Table 1 ). An ANOVA on the proportion of responses for new stimuli was conducted with metamemory response (remember/know) and attentional condition (congruent/incongruent) as within-participant factors. A significant main effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 19) = 51.31, p < .001, partial η 2 = .730), but no significant main effect was found for attentional condition (F (1, 19) = 0.14, p = .071, partial η 2 = .007). An interaction between these two factors was not significant (F (1, 19) = 0.002, p = .963, partial η 2 = .0001). Next, we conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of responses for old stimuli. A significant main effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 19) = 22.91, p < .001, partial η 2 = .547) and a main effect for attentional condition was approaching significance (F (1, 19) = 3.39, p = .081, partial η 2 = .152). An interaction between these two factors was nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 1.60, p = .222, partial η 2 = .078).
Further, we analyzed signal detection measures (d′ and C) for old/new responses pooled across metamemory responses. Response accuracy (d′) in the congruent condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.68) was not significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 2.02, SD = 0.77) (t (19) = 1.30, p = .211, d′ = 0.29). Moreover, response bias (C) in the congruent condition (M = 0.17, SD = 0.23) was not significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 0.13, SD = 0.25) (t (19) = 1.40, p =.176, d′ = 0.31).
In short, these additional analyses showed that attentional cueing did not have significant effects on participants' raw responses without the IRK procedure.
ii Additional analyses for the main experiment
To follow up the main results, additional analyses were conducted using the raw proportion of remember and know responses without the IRK procedure (Table 2 ). An ANOVA on the proportion of responses for new stimuli was conducted with metamemory response (remember/know) and attentional condition (congruent/incongruent) as within-participant factors. A significant main effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 21) = 75.63, p < .001, partial η 2 = .783), but no significant main effect was found for attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 3.48, p = .076, partial η 2 = .142). An interaction between these two factors was nearly significant (F (1, 21) = 4.44, p = .054, partial η 2 = .166). A simple main effect analysis revealed that the proportion of know responses was significantly higher in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition (F (1, 42) = 7.50, p = .009, partial η 2 = .263). No significant difference between the proportion of remember responses in the congruent condition and that in the incongruent condition was seen (F (1, 42) = 0.02, p = .892, partial η 2 = .001).
Next, we conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of responses for old stimuli. A significant main effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 21) = 16.29, p = .001, partial η 2 = .437). There was no significant main effect for attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 0.80, p = .382, partial η 2 = .037). An interaction between these two factors was nonsignificant (F (1, 21) = 0.01, p = .906, partial η 2 = .001).
To further support the main findings, we analyzed signal detection measures (d′ and C) for old/new responses pooled across metamemory responses. Response accuracy (d′) in the congruent condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.53) was not significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 1.73, SD = 0.69) (t (21) = 0.28, p = .782, d′ = 0.06). However, response bias (C) in the congruent condition (M = 0.16, SD = 0.25) was marginally significantly higher than that in the incongruent condition (M = 0.06, SD = 0.26) (t (21) = 1.93, p =.067, d′ = 0.41).
In sum, these additional results are consistent with the main results under the IRK assumption. † As the above-described ANOVAs include the mutually exclusive metamemory response (remember/know) as a factor, the assumption of independence is violated, which can lead to biased Type I and Type II error rates (see Scariano & Davenport, 1987) .
